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Brief of Appellant
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action brought by the respondent to quiet
the title of the respondent as against the appellant to the
following described real property situated in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, to-wit:
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Commencing 80 rods North and 27.5 rods East from
the Southwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 South,
Range I East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running
thence South 46° 27' East I55 feet; thence North 43°
33' East I20 feet, more or less, to a point 40 rods due
East of West line of said Section 29; thence South 307
feet, more or less, to a point 60 rods North of the South
line of said Section 29; thence West 479 feet to Easterly
line of State Road; thence Northeasterly along said
State Road to place of beginning.
Also, commencing 80 rods North and 27.5 rods East
and North 43° 33' East I60 feet from the Southwest
corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range l
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence South 46° 27' East I55 feet; thence South 43°
33' West to a point 80 rods due North of the South
line of said Section 29; thence .East 39 rods, ·more
or less to the center of the Southwest quarter of said
Section 29; thence North IO chains; thence West, to
Easterly line of State Road; thence South 43° 33'
West 750 feet, more or less, to the place of beginning.
(Tr. I)
The property in question was part of the tract of land
which was owned by Ephraim Jeppson, deceased, the hus·
band of the appellant and the father of the respondent. The
estate of the said Ephraim Jeppson, deceased, was enter·
ed for probate on February 6, I934 in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, as Probate File No. I836l. The appellant,
Emelia Larson Jeppson, who was the widow of Ephraim
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Jeppson, deceased, and the mother of the respondent was
appointed administratrix of said estate. (Tr. 33)
The administratrix had caused the real property of the
estate to be appraised by the duly appointed appraisers
of the Court and the appraisement was in the sum of

$2400.00.

I

!~

The real property of the estate had been mortgaged by
the administratrix under the authorization and direction of
the Court to the Home Owners' Loan Corporation under date
of March 9, 1934 in the sum of $1973.62. (Tr. 33)
The respondent claims that she was a creditor of the
estate in the amount of approximately $320.94.
During the month of April, 1936, the appellant as
administratrix of said estate petitioned the Court for confirmation of the sale of the real property of the estate to the
respondent and under date of April 17, 1936, an order
confirming the sale to the respondent Margie Jeppson for the
sum of $2205.45,. the highest bidder, was entered by the
Court. This consideration was discharged by the respondent's
claim above mentioned in the sum of $320.94 and by her
assumption of the mortgage in favor of Home Owners'
Loan Corporation in the remaining balance of $1884.51.

(Tr. 33)
An administratrix's deed issued under date of April
18, 1936, from Emelia L. Jeppson, administratrix of the
estate of Ephraim Jeppson, deceased, in favor of Margie
Jeppson, and said administratrix's deed was recorded April
27, 1936, in Book 165 of Deeds, pages 249-50, records of
the Office of the County Recorder ·of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. The said appellant did not sign the deed in
her individual capacity and has never made conveyance or
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delivery of a deed conveying her statutory dower interest.
(Tr. 34}
The real property claimed by the respondent is fenced,
unimproved pasture land, excepting one corner of said tract
which is occupied by a canning company for canning
purposes.
The appellant caused the other defendants to intervene
and in the answer and counter-claim in intervention the said
appellant claims a fee simple interest in an. undivided onethird interest. (Tr. 12}
Twelve days after the execution of the administratrix's
deed, to-wit: April 30, 1936, the State Road Commission of
Utah purchased a right-of-way for a highway through the
property and paid the respondent $1892.50, from which
sum the remaining balance of the Home Owners' Loan Cor·
poration Mortgage was paid and the property was released
from the lien of said mortgage. (Tr. 33) Subsequently on
February 15, 1937, the respondent at the request of the
appellant executed and delivered to Ervin Fenton Jeppson,
one of the intervening defendants and the son of the appellant, a warranty deed to a certain portion of the premises
which had been conveyed to her by administratrix's deed,
consisting of approximately 5 acres of unimproved property;
the consideration for the conveyance being that the said
Ervin Fenton Jeppson would remodel the old home to make
it liveable for the appellant. (Tr. 82)
On the 27th day of July, 1939, after the said Ervin
Fenton Jeppson had improved·the old home, the respondent
deeded to the appellant a portion of said premises described
in said administratrix's deed consisting of 56/100 acres
upon which the old home was located. No consideration
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passed from the appellant to the respondent for this conveyance and the appellant now lives on the premises so conveyed
to her by respondent. (Tr. 83, 86)
On another occasion the respondent gave a deed to the
appellant for another portion of said premises known as the
Snedeger Tract, and when the said tract was improved with
a two-room house it was sold to Snedeger. The $700.00 received for the conveyance was paid to the appellant, Emelia
Larson Jeppson. (Tr. 82, 109)
The balance of the premises has been pastured by Ervin
F. Jeppson, one of the intervening defendants. All general
taxes with the exception of the year 1947 were paid by the
said Ervin F. Jeppson. ( Tr. 34, 89)
In the defendant's answer in intervention it is stated that
the claim of the respondent of $325.94 satisfied by the
execution and delivery of said administratrix's deed, represented an accumulation of monies advanced by all other heirs
of said estate as well as the respondent.

II
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS
Comes now the above-named appellant and says that
there is manifest error in the records, proceedings and
judgment entered in this cause in this, to-wit:

l. The Court erred in making and entering its findings
of fact numbered 1 as follows, to wit: "That the plaintiff is
the sole, legal and equitable owner of the following described
tract of land situated in the County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, and particularly described as follows, to-wit:
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Commencing 80 rods North and 27.5 rods East from
the Southwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 46° 27' East 155 feet; thence North
43 o 33' East 120 feet, more or less, to a point 40 rods
due East of West line of said Section 29; thence South
307 feet, more or less, to a point 60 rods North of the
South line of said Section 29; thence West 479 feet,
to Easterly line of State Road; thence Northeasterly,
along said State Road, to place of beginning.
Also, commencing 80 rods North and 27.5 rods
East and North 43° 33' East 160 feetfrom the Southwest
corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence
South 46° 27' East 155 feet; thence South 43° 33'
West, to a point 80 rods due North of the South line
of said Section 29; thence East 39 rods, more or less,
to the center of the Southwest quarter of said Section
29; thence North 10 chains; thence West, to the Eastline of State Road; thence South 43 o 33' West 750
feet, more or less, to the place of beginning.
for the reason that there was not sufficient competent evidence
to support or warrant said finding. (Page 38 of Transcript)
2. The court erred in making and entering its finding
of fact numbered 3 as follows: "That in the purchase aforesaid the said plaintiff purchased the said property for her
own use and benefit, and not as trustee for the defendant
and the said intervening defendants or any one of them and
that the plaintiff paid the consideration therefore in the
manner directed by this court," in that there was no compe·
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tent evidence to the effect that she said plaintiff paid the
consideration therefor. (Page 38 of Transcript)
3. The court erred in making and entering its finding
of fact numbered 5 as follows: "That the claims of the
said defendent and each and all of the said intervening
defendants in and to the said described property are
without right whatever, and that said defendant and
all of the said intervening defendants have no right,
title, estate, equity or interest of, in or to the said real
property or any part thereof", for the reason that there was
not sufficient competent evidence to support or warrant
said finding that the said defendant, Emelia Larson Jeppson,
has conveyed her interest in said premises. (Page 38 of
Transcript)
4. The court erred in making and entering its finding
of fact to that portion of No. 6 as follows: "Said defendant
is now barred and estopped from asserting any interest
of, in, or to the premises retained by the plaintiff and
heretofore particularly described", for the reason that there
was not sufficient competent evidence to support or warrant
said finding. (Page 38 of Transcript)
5. The court erred in overruling the motion of appellant
for a new trial as shown on page 44 of the transcript.
6. The court erred in rendering judgment in favor of
the respondent against the appellant as shown on pages 35
and 36 of the transcript.
7. The court erred in its denial of the judgment in
favor of the appellant and against the respondent.
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POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT
(a) THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS THE SOLE,
LEGAL AND EQUITABLE OWNER OF THE TRACT OF
LAND DESCRIBED IN SAID COMPLAINT.
The court erred in making finding of fact No. 1 hereinabove set out in specification of errors paragraph l.
Appellant contends that because she did not join in the
administratrix's deed in her individual capacity her statutory
interest in an undivided one-third interest in the premises
described in the said administratrix's deed has not been
conveyed and that the said appellant is now the owner of
an undivided one-third interest in said premises.
Our statutes expressly abolish the common law estates
of dower and curtesy. (Section 101-4-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1943). In lieu thereof, Section 101-4-3, U. C. A.
1943, provides.
"One third in value of all the legal or equitable estates
in real property possessed by the husband at any time
during the marriage, to which the wife has made no
relinquishment of her rights, shall be set apart as her
property in fee simple, if she survives him ... Property
distributed under the provisions of this section shall be
free from all debts of the decedent except those secured by liens for work or labor done or material furnished
exclusively for the improvement of the same, and except
those created for the purchase thereof, and for taxes
levied thereon ...."
Our Supreme Court had occasion to construe the above
section in the case of In re BULLEN'S ESTATE, 47 Utah
96, 151 Pac. 533, wherein the court said:
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"What the wife receives under Section 2826 [which is
identical with Section 101-4-3, U. C. A. 1943]-one
third in fee simple of all the legal and equitable estates
in real property possessed by the husband during
coverture and not relinquished by her - she receives,
not as an heir of her husband, but in her own right,
something which belongs to her absolutely and of which
she could not have been deprived by will or by any
other voluntary act of her husband without her consent.
Under that section, she is not an heir within the meaning
of our intestate or succession statutes."
A number of authorities are reviewed in the opmwn,
and among others, the court quotes the following from
"In re ESTATE OF STRAHAN, 93 Neb. 828:
"It has been held by the great weight of authority that
dower is not immune because it is dower, but because it,
like the right to the homestead and to the distributive
share of the widow of the estate of her deceased husband, belonged to her inchoately during his life and
·vested fully in her at his death. Under the present
statute the wife takes her interest in the estate of her
deceased husband by operation of law. It is something
which belongs to her absolutely and independently of
any right of inheritance of succession. The share of
the realty which under our law goes to the widow independent of any will or act of the husband is not, so to
speak, a part of his estate and is no more liable to a
succession tax at his death than is her individual property derived from her own ancestors and held in her
own name, though the husband may have had the
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management and control of the estate during his lifetime."
Thus a widow holds her statutory interest, absolutely and
in fee simple, in h~r own right and completely independent
of the estate of her husband. Her interest is not a part of
the husband's estate and is not subject to the husband's debts
except such as are enumerated in the statute, i. e. those
incurred directly for the benefit of the property involved.
The interest, not being a part of the husband's estate, does
not pass to a purchaser under a probate sale of the property
belonging to the husband's estate, unless the widow joins in
the conveyance in her own right or is otherwise estopped
from claiming her interest. If it be argued that the construction placed upon the statute in the case of In re Bullen's Estate was influenced by the fact that it was a case
involving the inheritance tax statute wherein the tendency
is to construe the statute in favor of the taxpayer, the case
of STAATS v. STAATS, 63 Utah 470, 226 Pac. 677, broadens the interpretation to other than tax cases. That case
involved a contest between a widow and son respecting the
husband's realty, the son claiming that he was entitled to
some as surviving partner of his father and to other of the
property as tenant in common. The court said:
"Counsel have cited some authorities to the effect that a
widow of a deceased husband takes her dower interest
as an heir, and that she is protected under the statute
aforesaid. [Statute relating to disqualification of interested witnesses]. This court is, however, committed
to a contrary doctrine, in that we have held that under
our statute the widow of a deceased husband does not
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take as an heir. In re Bullen's Estate, 47 Utah 96.
It is held that a widow takes here one third interest in
her husband's real estate not as an heir, but in her
own right. That case was subsequently approved and
followed in Re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah I7, I89, Pac.
409."
As to the manner in which the widow's interest matures
from an inchoate interest held during her husband's lifetime
into an absolute interest the court In Re Reynolds' Estate,
90 Utah 4IS, 62 Pac. (2nd) 270, has this to say:
" ... The wife's interest has some of the aspects of joint
tenancy in one-third of the real estate. In the common
law joint tenancy, each owned every bit of the whole.
One who dies simply fell away from the title. The
husband by predeceasing her does not effectuate a
passage of title of her one third, but only recedes from
the interest she had, at the same time maturing it."
WAS WIDOW'S INTEREST DIVESTED BY THE
PROBATE SALE?
The appellant, Em eli a Larson Jeppson, the widow of
Ephraim Jeppson, the latter being the record owner of
the premises involved in this action at the time of his demise,
was at the time of her husband's death the owner in fee
simple of one third of the said real estate. Was that
interest divested by virtue of the probate sale of the property
in the matter of the Estate of Ephraim Jeppson, deceased?
Speaking of the interest which passes under a probate sale,
it is said in 2I American Jurisprudence, Executors and
Administrators 11 568:
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"All that it (the probate court) ever pretends to do in
a proceeding of this character is to order the sale of
whatever interest the decedent may have had in the
land at the time of his death. It never assumes to
decide whether he was in fact the owner."
Since the decedent here had no interest in the widow's
statutory estate, that interest did not pass merely by virtue of
the probate sale. The rule as to dower and curtesy rights is
slated in 24 C. J. 684:
"As a widow's dower is not usually subject to the general
debts of the husband, her right to dower, or to a statutory
estate in the nature thereof, is not usually divested by
an administration sale, although under some statutes the
rule is otherwise." (citing decisions from a number
of states)
A footnote on the same page of 24 C. J. quotes from SHELL
v. YOUNG, 78 Ark. 479, 95 S. W. 798:
"The sale is simply inoperative, so far as the widow's
dower is concerned, as it is an interest in the land
superior to the claims of creditors, and the purchaser
simply took subject to the right of the widow's dower,
which may be set aside against the purchaser as well
as the heirs and creditors. Livingston v. Cochran, 33
Ark. 306; Well v. Smith, 40 Ark. 17"
In OWEN v. SLATTER, 26 Ala. 547,62 Am. D. 745, the
sale was made by commissioners appointed by the court
upon the petition of the widow as administratrix. The court
said:
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"The sale of the real estate, made under decree of the
Probate Court, vests in the purchasers only the title
which the ancestor had, and which upon his death
descended upon his heirs-at-law. The widow's right
to dower is unaffected by the sale, unless, indeed, she
bars her right by some act which, in a court of equity,
would constitute it a fraud in her to insist upon it.
"The fact in the case before us do not make out
such a bar. True, the widow in that case is administratrix; but the law prescribes her duty, and so long
as she acts within the scope of those duties, it would
be singular indeed that she should forfeit her rights
as an individual, merely by reason of her having properly complied with the requirements of the law in her
fiduciary character . . . . ..
"We are of the opinion, therefore, that there was no
fraud on the part of Mrs. Owen, in failing to announce
at the sale that the land was sold subject to her dower;
neither is she estopped from setting up her claim to
dower by reason of her silence."
It is submitted that although in our state dower has been
expressly abolished and many of the cases cited in this brief
deal with dower in the common law sense, many of the
same rules apply. Almost all of our states have either
abolished or modified by statute the rules of the common
law with respect to dower and curtesy, but the terminology
and rules of interpretation and construction have been
retained. See 42 Harvard Law Review 330. It is there
said that "although common law dower and curtesty have
been superseded by more extensive statutory provisions in
the United States, the decisions of the courts in construing
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dower and curtesy are still used in the interpretation of our
present statutes. Consequently, the legal rules and principles
incident to the common law system are usually applied to
the present statutory system." Moreover, the statutory
estate conferred in this state in lieu of dower is a larger
estate than the common law estate of dower, and therefore
requires at least as strong an act on the part of the widow
to divest that estate as did the common law estate of dower.
And by the same token, this interest requires at least as
much protection by our courts as was the case with common
law dower.
"Dower has ever been a favorite of the law, statutes
granting being liberally construed in the wife's favor,
and it is uniformly hel~ that no construction of a statute
should be adopted which tends to deprive the wife of
her right thereto or of any beneficent provision given
in lieu thereof." 2 Tiffany on Real property (3rd Ed.)
p. 451, citing cases.
SALE BY WIDOW AS ADMINISTRATRIX AS
BARRING RIGHT
As is shown above, a probate sale of the husband's realty
does not of itself divest the widow of her dower interest in
the land. We shall now consider the question of whether a
probate sale conducted by the widow as administratrix of her
husband's estate bars her dower interest. The cases are
collected in an annotation in 30 A. L. R. 944. The annota·
tion begins:
"A deed of real estate by the widow of the owner as his
administratrix, made under the order of the probate
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court, does not bar her from claiming dower In the
real estate so sold.
Wright v. DeGroff, 14 Mich. 165;
Foley v. Boulware, 86 Mo. App. 674;
Sip v. Lawback, 17 N. J. L. 442;
Shurtz v. Thomas, 8 Pa. 359."

In the Sip v. Lawback case above referred to, where a
widow and two other persons were administrators of the
husband's estate and sold land by an order of the court,
the court states:
"Defendant knew of widow's right of dower or might
have known it, except for his own negligence, -Defendant was a neighbor to Mr. Sip and his wife, he knew
that Mr. Sip died intestate, he knew he was treating
with administrators for the purchase of the land and that
the act of the legislature (which every m"an shall be
presumed to know) entitled the widow to dower. It
was an administrators sale, the advertisement, the articles of vendue and the whole proceedings was notice
to everyone that the widow was only selling as administratrix and only selling such title and interest in the
land as an administratrix could sell."
It is the opinion of counsel that the case before the Court
is even stronger than the above cited case as certainly the
plaintiff, the daughter of the defendant, Emelia Larson
Jeppson, knew that Mr. Jeppson died intestate and she also
knew or was presumed to know that her mother had a statutory dower interest in the real property possessed by the
husband at the time of his death.
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In Foley vs. Boulware, 86 Mo. App. 674, the widow
was not estopped from claiming dower in the land, although
she told the purchaser before the sale that the title was
good and perfect and gave no intimation that she claimed
dower, but there was nothing to show that she was acting
in bad faith.
In Martien v. Norris, 91 No. 465, the declaration of
the agent of the executors to the purchaser, "that the title
was perfect or unquestionable" did not have the effect
of estopping the widow from claiming dower, although she
thought at the time that she was not entitled to dower.
In Wright vs. DeGroff, 14 Mich. 164, the administratrix
deed contained the following clause:
"And I do hereby covenant with saidthat I will
warrant and defend said premises against the lawful
claims and demands of all persons claiming by, from,
or under me, but against no other person."
It was held that she was not estopped thereby to claim dower
in the land.
Under this annotation the cases which allow an estoppel
of the claim of dower are where the facts can be construed
as a surrender of the right of dower. As an example, Gerber
vs. Upton, 123 Mich. 605, where it appeared that the purchaser agreed with the widow to pay the full value of the
land, and that she was to surrender her right of dower and
homestead interest and to give a deed therefor to him and
that it was announced at the sale that the purchaser would
obtain a clear title.
Also, Stephens vs. Craigen Co. 192 N. Y. Supp, 555, in
the body of the deed it recites:
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"All the estate therein which the party of the first part
has or has power to convey or dispose of, whether
individually or by virtue of said will or otherwise."
None of these facts apply to the present case.
(b) THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE CLAIM OF SAID
APPELLANT IS WITHOUT RIGHT WHATEVER,
AND THAT SAID APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT,
TITLE, ESTATE, EQUITY OR INTEREST OF, IN,
OR TO THE SAID REAL PROPERTY OR ANY PART
THEREOF.
The court erred in making finding of fact No. 5 hereinabove set out in specification of errors paragraph 3.
Same points argued by appellant under subdivision (a)
above applies to this subdivision.
(c) THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT IS NOW
BARRED AND ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
ANY INTEREST OF, IN OR TO THE PREMISES
RETAINED BY THE RESPONDENT.
The court erred in making finding of fact No. 6 hereinabove set out in specification of errors paragraph 4.
Same points argued by appellant under subdivision (a)
above applies to this subdivision.
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WHEREFORE appellant prays that the judgement he
reversed with costs assessed against respondent.

Respectfully submitted,

LE GRAND P. BACKMAN,
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant

Received copy of the foregoing brief of appellant this

---day of December, 1948.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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